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Organizing to Strategize in the Face of Interactions:
Preventing Premature Lock-in

Abstract: Motivated by real examples that run contrary to conventional wisdom, we examine how firms
organize themselves to strategize well. Interactions among decisions make strategizing difficult. They
raise the specter that a firm’s strategizing efforts will get stuck in a web of conflicting constraints
prematurely, before managers explore a wide enough range of possibilities. A key role of organizing is to
free strategizing efforts and encourage broad search. At the same time, organizing must ensure that
strategizing efforts stabilize once the firm discovers an effective set of choices. The need to balance
search and stability, we argue, is a central challenge of organizing. We explore this challenge with an
agent-based simulation of firms that organize to strategize in the face of interactions. The results shed
light on our contrary-to-wisdom examples. They show why firms may benefit from unnecessary overlap
between departments; how firms can increase firm-wide search by reining in the search efforts of
individual managers; and how a change in organizational structure – e.g., a shift from decentralization to
integration – may reflect not a reversal of early mistakes but an effective sequence of organizing. The
disparate examples share an underlying logic. The unnecessary overlap, the reining-in of managers, the
period of decentralization – all can be seen as organizational mechanisms to ensure the broad, early
search that a firm needs in order to cope with interactions among decisions.

1. Introduction
Despite five decades of research on organizing, real organizations continue to surprise us. Consider a
few examples.
•

Conventional wisdom holds that good organizational structures are as modular as possible:
integrally related decisions are grouped under the purview of a single management team, and
managerial overlap is avoided across departments that do not affect one another. Yet in its vehicle
development efforts, Toyota intentionally leaves “unnecessary” overlap across departments. As
we describe below, the company does not modularize sets of decisions that, in concept, are
decomposable, and it seems to benefit as a result.

•

Conventional wisdom argues that to catalyze innovation in a firm, senior managers should
liberate low-level decision makers and allow them to explore a wide range of alternatives within
their separate domains. Yet in an American industrial computing company discussed below,
senior executives prompted an outburst of innovation by reining in the exploration conducted by
subordinates.

•

It is generally held that when top managers restructure their organization, it is to rectify past
mistakes, often large and serious ones. In its e-commerce efforts, for instance, discount broker
Schwab started with an independent subsidiary, but it soon reintegrated its online and
conventional operations – seemingly reversing an earlier organizational error. We will argue
below that such sequencing may reflect not a mistake, but an effective way to reach good sets of
strategic choices in a novel environment.

These examples suggest that much of what conventional wisdom holds to be true about organizing is
sometimes not. Students of organizational design have long recognized the paucity of universal truths in
their field. In the 1960s, mounting evidence that little is always true about organizing led researchers to
adopt a contingency outlook: prescriptions for organizing may be valid, but each prescription holds true
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only for a subset of the possible environmental conditions.1 This begs the question, what are the relevant
environmental conditions that define the contingencies? And precisely how do environmental conditions
lead to different prescriptions for organizing?
To contribute to tackling two such ambitious questions, we bring two perspectives to bear. First, we
focus on one particular role played by organizing. A key goal of organizing is to enable a company to
strategize well. We conceive of a firm’s management team as facing a set of decisions about how to
procure, sell, deliver, service, hire, design, finance, and so forth. For the team, strategizing is the search
for a combination of choices that, together, generates strong performance. Organizing is the allocation of
rights over the choices to members of the team as well as the coordination of choices through incentives,
communication, and hierarchy. Organizing matters greatly in our view because it shapes how a firm
strategizes – how it searches for a set of choices and, therefore, what set it eventually adopts. Schwab’s
early decision to organize e-commerce as a separate subsidiary, for example, affected how it marketed,
priced, executed, and serviced online trades. This view of the relationship between organizing and
strategizing is consistent with past research. Prior work has highlighted how organizational structure
might affect a firm’s search for a strategy by molding resource allocation and strategic planning
processes, by altering how managers perceive opportunity, and by boosting the supply of new managers
who pursue new businesses, for instance.2, 3
The second perspective we bring to bear is a point of view on what makes strategizing difficult. We
focus especially on interactions among decisions as a source of challenge. Strategy scholars have long
emphasized that the decisions managers face are highly interdependent.4 In its early online operations,
for example, Schwab’s decision not to offer the very lowest price for an online trade was related to its
choice to deploy its valuable brand online: the brand name made it viable to charge a premium over noname e-brokers, and setting the lowest price may have sullied the brand offline. Interactions are not only
pervasive but, we argue, they have a profound impact on the difficulty of strategizing. Searching for an
effective set of choices is relatively easy when decisions are independent and can be resolved one by one.
Strategizing is harder when decisions depend on one another. Tradeoffs then arise across choices, and the
2

danger looms that an incremental approach will leave a firm with an internally consistent but not-veryeffective set of decisions. Such a set of decisions would be a local optimum, but it might be far from the
global optimum.
Moreover, interactions make organizing – the allocation and coordination of decisions – relevant for
strategizing. If the decisions facing a firm were independent, the allocation of them to decision makers
would not affect their resolution, and coordination would be unnecessary. One could even assign each
choice to a separate decision maker and give everyone complete autonomy over his or her choice. With
pervasive interactions, in contrast, organizing can have a deep influence on how strategizing, the search
for choices, unfolds and what set of choices a firm eventually adopts. To the first question we posed
above – what are the relevant environmental conditions that define contingencies? – we would offer a
partial answer: interactions among decisions are one important source of contingency. That is, the right
way to organize depends in part on the presence of interactions among a firm’s strategic decisions. This
echoes prior contingency literature, which focuses on the complexity of a firm’s task environment as a
key contingency.5
The second question posed above – precisely how do environmental conditions lead to different
prescriptions for organizing? – is harder to address. To tackle it, we first narrow it, focusing on how
degrees of interaction affect prescriptions for organizing. We then use the counterintuitive examples
above, involving Toyota, the industrial computing firm, and Schwab, and we couple them with an agentbased simulation model of organizing and strategizing. The model identifies conditions, related to
interactions, in which the seemingly odd phenomena of the examples arise. Together, the examples and
the model provide some general insight about how a firm should organize to strategize well in the face of
interactions. The examples appear quite different, but they have an underlying similarity. In all three
cases, the challenge before the management team is to organize in such a way that strategizing efforts
explore a considerable variety of configurations of interdependent choices before locking in on one
particular configuration. “Unnecessary” overlap between departments in Toyota, restrictions on low-level
exploration in the industrial computing firm, and sequenced organizational structures at Schwab may
3

serve this purpose. They might prevent a team from locking into a poor set of choices prematurely. Firms
that organize to strategize well, we find, manage to avoid premature lock-in. However, they also have the
discipline to cease exploration once they have discovered an effective set of choices. In ways we describe
below, they balance search and stability.
Our plan of attack is as follows. Section 2 lays out a model of organizing to strategize that is simple,
yet is general enough to encompass all three examples. Sections 3, 4, and 5 examine the examples, each
with corresponding results from the simulation. Section 6 draws the examples together and offers
reflections that span the examples and go beyond them.

2. A model of organizational search and organizational design
Techniques and imagery from recent studies of complex adaptive systems can be deployed to
visualize how interactions influence both strategizing and organizing. The essential task of a firm’s
management team, in our conception, is to resolve a host of decisions – decisions that, together, make up
the firm’s strategy. For instance, managers must decide whether or not to broaden the firm’s product line,
to increase the advertising budget, to invest more heavily in research and development, to invest in
customer relationship management software, etc. The management team can be visualized, then, as
operating on a high-dimensional landscape. Each horizontal dimension of the landscape represents one of
the decisions, and the vertical dimension records the performance that results from each possible
configuration of choices.6 Management’s problem in strategizing is to find a good combination of
choices – to discover a high point on the landscape. Because managers are bounded in their rationality,7
the search process involves exploratory, groping behavior – not simply a consideration of all alternatives
followed by a leap to the global peak. A common response to the cognitive limits of individual managers
is to distribute authority and responsibility for discrete decisions across a number of managers. The
allocation of interdependent decisions to independent managers, accompanied by coordinating devices
such as incentives, communication, and hierarchy, is at the heart of organizing.
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When a firm’s decisions do not interact with each other, in the sense that each decision’s contribution
to performance does not depend on others, the performance landscape is smooth and single-peaked.
Figure 1 shows a highly simplified example of this situation, with just two decisions determining firm
performance. The decisions do not interact: the marginal impact of decision 1 on performance does not
depend on decision 2, and vice versa (or equivalently, the shape of a cross-section with respect to decision
1 is identical for all levels of decision 2, and vice versa). In such a situation, starting from any
combination of choices, one can move to the global optimum by a series of performance-improving
changes to individual decisions. Incremental improvement will eventually yield the very best combination
of choices, so strategizing is trivial. Moreover, a firm’s organizational structure has little bearing on this
outcome since, regardless of the allocation of choices, each subset of the firm can safely operate as its
own fiefdom. A manager in charge of decision 1 and a manager in charge of decision 2, each maximizing
his or her independent contributions, will arrive atop the global peak, even without coordination.
<INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE>
If one introduces interactions, however, the performance landscape becomes rugged. Local peaks –
combinations of choices that provide no opportunity for improvement by means of incremental change –
proliferate. Figure 2 shows a simple example of such a situation, with each decision’s impact on
performance now dependent on the choice made with respect to the other decision. Strategizing becomes
challenging as the specter arises that a firm may get stranded on a low local peak, unable to find better
options despite poor performance. Also, efforts to organize now affect how well the firm copes with the
challenge of strategizing. A decision made by one manager may now alter the performance consequences
of another manager’s choices. If the firm is organized so that low-level managers are left to their own
devices, those managers may engage in rounds of mutually destructive improvement efforts, each moving
uphill on the portion of the landscape that he or she controls but sinking the portion that others manage.
And if those managers are coordinated by a vertical hierarchy, the managers may filter information in
order to promote parochial interests, thereby damaging the firm as a whole. In the face of interactions,
managers must think carefully about how to organize to strategize.
5

<INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE>
We embed the ideas behind this imagery in an agent-based simulation model, a model in which firms
with different approaches to organizing attempt to strategize. Computer simulations have long been used
in management science to create “laboratories” in which researchers can conduct rigorous virtual
experiments on modeled organizations.8 In agent-based simulations, which have gained popularity
recently, researchers model individual agents – in our case, managers – rather than the system as a whole.
We confront modeled managers with certain stochastically-generated environments, give them heuristics
for reacting to the environment, allow them to interact with one another in a series of periods, and record
the resulting behavior over time. By altering the types of environments that managers face and the ways
that managers are organized, and by repeating the experiments hundreds of times for each type of
environment, we can isolate how well different organizations cope with various types of environment.
Let us describe (1) how we model the environment and (2) how we model managers and organizations.

2.1 Environments with interactions
The environment we model requires the management team of each firm to resolve N binary decisions
(i.e., yes/no choices). For instance, a1 may represent the decision to increase the advertising budget (a1 =
1) or not (a1 = 0) while a2 may represent the decision to increase product breadth (a2 = 1) or not (a2 = 0).
In total, thus, the firm has 2N possible configurations of choices a =(a1, a2, … aN), each represented by an
N-digit string of zeroes and ones. Using an approach described below, the computer generates a payoff,
V(a), for every configuration of choices. The mapping of all possible choice configurations onto payoffs
creates the performance landscape on which a firm is operating. A performance landscape consists of N
“horizontal” dimensions, representing the N choices a firm has to make, and one “vertical” dimension,
which records payoffs.
The payoffs V(a) are generated in a stochastic but well-controlled manner. In particular, each
decision ai is assumed to make a contribution to overall performance. The contribution of decision ai, ci(ai,
a-i), depends on how the choice itself is resolved (e.g., whether the advertising budget was increased or
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not) and on how other decisions were resolved that interact with decision ai (e.g., whether the product line
was extended or not). Formally, an influence matrix M tracks the interactions among the decisions. M is
an N*N matrix which has an entry in row i, column j, if column decision j affects row decision i. For
instance, Panel A of Figure 3 shows an example of a fully interdependent influence matrix with N = 8 in
which each decision affects each other decision, while Panel B of Figure 3 shows a modular influence
matrix in which decisions 1-4 interact richly, decision 5-8 interact richly, but no interactions exist across
these two sets of decisions.
< INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE>
Lastly, for each landscape, the particular values of all possible contributions are determined by
drawing randomly from a uniform distribution over the unit interval, i.e., ci(ai, a-i) ~ u[0, 1]. The value of
a given set of choices a is then given by the average of the N contributions:

V(a) = [c1(a1, a-1) + c2(a2, a-2) + … + cN(aN, a-N)]/N

2.2 Organizations and managers
To study the effects of different organizational structures, we place firms with different structures
onto the same randomly chosen starting point on a performance landscape and let managers within these
firms try to find high locations on this landscape over a number of periods (up to 200). Each period, we
record the performance of each firm, measuring the firm’s value that period, V(a), as a percentage of the
value associated with the best possible combination of decisions on the landscape. We then generate a
new performance landscape with the same interaction pattern (but with newly drawn contribution values)
and let firms again search for high locations. We repeat this procedure 1,000 times to guarantee that
performance differences we might detect are driven not by the stochastic elements of the model but by the
inherent properties of the different organizational structures.
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To illustrate the phenomena outlined in the Introduction, we focus on three organizational features:
the task allocation; the degree of exploration engaged in by department-level managers; and the presence
or absence of a hierarchical structure.
Task allocation. The N decisions of the firm can be allocated in various ways to different decision
makers. In our model, we focus on firms with either one or two departments. A string of a’s and b’s
denotes the allocation of the N decisions to the two departments. For instance, the task allocation
aaaaaaaa would denote an integrated firm that has assigned all eight decisions to one department, while
aaaabbbb would denote a firm that has assigned the first four decisions to one department and the other
four decisions to the other department.
Degree of exploration by department-level managers. In each period, each department manager
considers a number of randomly chosen, local alternatives, ALT, to the current status quo choices. (Local
alternatives are alternatives that differ in one individual choice from the current set of choices.) Thus, ALT
measures the degree of exploration that department-level managers engage in. For instance, with task
allocation aaaabbbb, current choices 00000000, and ALT = 2, the first manager might consider 1000 and
0010, while the second manager might consider 0100 and 1000. In particular, each manager evaluates the
contributions of the decisions that are under his or her control. To continue the example, the first
manager, controlling the first four decisions, would compute for each alternative under consideration:

V1(a) = [c1(a1, a-1) + c2(a2, a-2) + c3(a3, a-3) + c4(a4, a-4))]/4

Decentralized or hierarchical structure. Once the managers have evaluated their ALT alternatives, the
firm implements changes, or retains the status quo. In the decentralized structure, each department
manager implements the alternative with the highest value for the department or retains the status quo if
no alternative yields higher departmental performance. This new choice configuration serves then as the
starting point for search in the next period.
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In the hierarchical structure, each manager sends his or her two most preferred alternatives (which
may include the status quo) to a “CEO.” The CEO evaluates all possible combinations of alternatives and
status quo choices for the two departments and implements the combination that yields highest firm
performance. Again, the new choice configuration serves as the starting point for search in the next
period. (See Figure 4 for a summary of the two organizational structures.)
<INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE>
In the following sections, we will present a number of intriguing results generated with this
simulation set-up that shed light on the experiences of Schwab (Section 3), Toyota (Section 4), and the
industrial computing firm (Section 5) that we sketched in the Introduction. Due to space constraints, we
often will not be able to describe all results in full detail or show various robustness tests of the results.
The interested reader will find more detail in the papers cited in the references.9

3. The benefit of changing organizational structures
In 1995, in its attempt to respond to the successful arrival of internet-only brokerage firms, Charles
Schwab created a free-standing electronic brokerage unit called e.schwab. The unit was given free reign,
moved to a separate building, and held responsible for its own profit and losses.10 Illustrating nicely the
effect that organizing has on strategizing, the new unit responded with an array of new practices,
including new internal software that allowed for a purely electronic customer relationship, a flat pricing
scheme rather than the sliding scale of commissions that Schwab used in its traditional brokerage
business, and a limited level of services offered to customers. While e.schwab was successful, a number
of problems arose. In particular, customers were confused and irritated by the different prices and service
levels offered under the same Schwab brand name, and the separate computer systems at e.schwab and
Schwab made it difficult for customer representatives to gain access to full customer information.11 In
1998, Charles Schwab decided to reintegrate e.schwab. This included eliminating the separate P&L,
renaming e.schwab as Schwab.com, creating flat commissions for all trades, and allowing all customers
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full access to Schwab’s customer services. In sum, the eventual firm became a mix of the e.schwab
experiment and the traditional Schwab brokerage.
One reading of this experience is that Schwab did not correctly anticipate the eventual difficulties that
arose from creating a spin-off and this forced it to reintegrate e.schwab at a later point. While this might
certainly be true, the approach of first decentralizing and later reintegrating turns out to be, as our
simulation model shows, a powerful approach for a firm that faces interdependent decisions and needs to
reconfigure its set of choices significantly.
To model the effects of different ways of organizing (integration, decentralization, and reintegration),
we consider three firms that each faces eight decisions (N = 8). A fully integrated firm assigns all
decisions to “one department” (aaaaaaaa). A decentralized firm assigns decisions to two departments and
lets each department implement those alternatives it finds profitable (aaaabbbb). A reintegrating firm
operates as a decentralized firm (aaaabbbb) for 50 periods, then adopts the integrated task allocation
(aaaaaaaa). (The results are not sensitive to the choice of 50 periods.) For the simulation presented here,
we assume that firms operate on fully interdependent performance landscapes, where each decision
affects all others. All three firms are placed on the same, randomly chosen starting point, and each firm’s
performance is recorded over 200 periods. Figure 5 charts the average performance trajectories of these
three firms over 1,000 landscapes.
< INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE>
Figure 5 reveals three patterns. First, in the short run, the integrated firm has a performance advantage
over the decentralized firm. Due to the pervasive interactions across the two divisions, each department in
a decentralized firm is likely to engage in actions that are beneficial for itself but hurts the firm overall
and undermines the improvement efforts of the other department. Such actions slow down the overall
performance improvement of the firm as compared to an integrated firm, which rejects changes that could
hurt the performance of the whole firm even temporarily.
Second, the decentralized firm outperforms the integrated firm in the long run. In the presence of
many interactions, the typical performance landscape becomes very rugged, with many “local peaks” on
10

which firms can get stuck. As a result, broad search is valuable. The decentralized firm, with each
department free to implement changes that benefit it alone, tends to engage in much broader search than
does an integrated firm, which implements only those alternatives that improve performance for the entire
firm. Consequently, the decentralized firm fares better than the integrated firm in the long run.
Third, and most striking, the reintegrating firm outperforms either pure structure. To understand this
result — and more broadly to understand the general effect of organizing on strategizing — the concept
of an organizational “sticking point” is helpful.12 Organizational sticking points are configurations of
choices from which a firm will not move. Organizational sticking points are, thus, the eventual outcomes
of many periods of strategizing, i.e., of searching for high-performing choice configurations. Sticking
points have two origins. First, a sticking point can arise when boundedly rational actors have exhausted
their knowledge about possible alternatives that they would find more attractive than the status quo. This
type of sticking point is very much akin to the notion of a “competency trap.”13 Second, a sticking point
can arise when no alternative can be found that is acceptable to all those in the organization who must
consent to the implementation of the alternative.
Organizational structure has a profound effect on organizational sticking points. For the integrated
structure discussed above, a configuration a is a sticking point if no other configuration a' can be found
that differs from a in one element and that has higher performance than a. In contrast, for the
decentralized structure, configuration a is a sticking point only if neither department manager finds a
profitable deviation for his or her department. Thus, different organizational structures lead strategizing
efforts to terminate at different sticking points. Moreover, different structures lead to different numbers of
sticking points. Decentralized firms are less likely to become stuck; they move if either department
manager can spot a parochial improvement. For this reason, decentralized firms tend to search rugged
landscapes much more broadly than integrated firms. On the other hand, the decentralized firm suffers
from two drawbacks. First, it may wander forever, with department managers adopting sequences of
changes that undermine each other. In contrast, the integrated firm always stabilizes around some sticking
point – albeit sometimes a mediocre configuration. Second, the decentralized firm may become stuck at a
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point where an incremental change that is attractive for the firm is left unexploited, simply because the
change is not parochially appealing to the department that must implement it. The integrated firm, in
contrast, never leaves incremental improvements untapped in the long run.
The reintegrating firm couples the broad search of the decentralized firm with the stability and
exploitative power of the integrated firm. In its early days, when it resembles a decentralized firm, the
reintegrator migrates to a promising area of the landscape. After it changes to become integrated, the
reintegrator scales and eventually becomes stuck on a high spot within that area. The early, broad search
provided by the decentralized structure puts the firm in a favorable position for further search once the
firm reintegrates.
In these results, we see the first instance of a pattern that will recur: organizing (or a change in
organizing) can help a firm by preventing its strategizing efforts from terminating too early, i.e., by
shaking it off low-performing sticking points.
Our finding – that sequenced organizing improves strategizing – does not hold up under all
circumstances. We would emphasize two limitations. First, the finding depends crucially on the presence
of interactions. Without them, there is little need for the broad search that the decentralized structure
provides. Figure 6 repeats the simulation of Figure 5 but with no interactions among choices. The
decentralized firm now has a short-term advantage over the integrated firm because its structure benefits
from parallel processing of alternatives in each department. In the long run, all three structures end up on
the same global peak of the landscape. Thus, in this case, sequencing from a decentralized to an integrated
structure does not help the firm at all.
< INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE>
The second limitation concerns the starting point of a firm. For a firm that needs to adjust its activity
configuration only slightly, the broad exploration generated by a period of decentralization may lead the
firm too far astray. In such cases, an integrated structure can perform better than reintegration. Suppose in
our simulation that a firm begins its search D changes away from the best possible activity configuration,
the global peak. A firm with a low level of D needs only minor change in its activities to perform its best,
12

while a firm with a high level requires radical change. Figure 7 compares the performances in period 200
of integrated and reintegrated firms that start the same distance from the global peak, as a function of that
distance. When the firms require only modest adjustment (low D), integration outperforms reintegration
(and, though not shown, the decentralized structure as well). It is only at higher D that a period of broad
search is beneficial.
< INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE>
This finding sheds light on an observation in the financial services industry: some very successful
firms did not follow a path of decentralization followed by reintegration. For instance, Vanguard, one of
the world’s largest and most successful mutual fund providers, never created an e-commerce division, but
adopted Internet technology within its integrated structure from the outset. The contrast between
Vanguard and Schwab reflects, we believe, a difference in their starting positions. Vanguard had long had
a direct distribution system and mail-based customer information activities. Thus, the company found that
the Internet could be plugged into its existing strategy quite naturally. The Internet required it to make
relatively modest adjustments. Schwab, in contrast, faced change on many dimensions. It needed the
broad search that a decentralized structure provides.
This example highlights a general point. In the literature on technological innovation, technological
changes have traditionally been classified as either competence-destroying or competence-enhancing.14
We would argue that the character of a technological change is not an inherent property of the change, but
depends on a firm’s current set of choices. Imagine two firms whose past strategizing efforts have led
them to different sticking points. A technological change now raises a new global peak distant from one
firm and close to the other. The change is competence-destroying for the first firm, requiring change in
many activities, even while it is competence-enhancing for the other, requiring only modest adjustments.
Moreover, though the firms experience the same environmental change, they need very different
organizational responses: the first firm needs an organizational structure that encourages broad
exploration, while the second firm does not. The difference arises because past strategizing efforts left the
firms on different sticking points. Past strategizing thus influences the appropriate way to organize.
13

In this section, we have focused on one particular sequence of structures, from decentralization to
integration, and we have argued that early exploration under decentralization can free a firm from low
sticking points. This argument can be broadened. In related work, we have explored organizational
structures beyond the integrated and decentralized structures considered here. Each is associated with a
different set of sticking points when interactions exist.15 After a number of periods of search under any
one structure, a firm gravitates towards a stable set of activities. A change to a different organizational
structure can dislodge a firm from this stable set, rejuvenating search and leading the firm to a better
activity configuration.16 A shift in structure does not necessarily imply that the old structure was bad and
that the new structure is inherently better; as Figure 5 showed, the new structure, had it been adopted from
the beginning, would have led to lower performance on average. The benefit arises from adopting a
structure with different sticking points, not from adopting a “better” structure. When choices interact,
changes in organizing can spark productive strategizing. This is true even in a stable environment. The
academic literature on organizations tends to assume that environmental changes come before, and drive,
changes in organizing. Here, we see reasons that top managers might reorganize in a perfectly stable
environment, just to “shake things up.”
For practicing managers, our results have two key implications. First, if a firm can afford a period of
broad search and needs to reconfigure its choices substantially, the firm can benefit by first adopting an
organizational structure with parochially-minded sub-divisions, then shifting to a structure that reins in
sub-divisions and makes them accountable for their firm-wide impact. Second, when a firm’s
performance stagnates – a sign that it may have reached an organizational sticking point – a change in
organizing may help the management team dislodge itself from its current set of choices and restart its
strategizing efforts, heading towards higher regions of its performance landscape.

4. Not modularizing the decomposable
A central tenet of organizational design theory is to group together those tasks that interact with each
other.17 Indeed, the desired end state of modularization is to decompose a system into sub-systems that are
14

entirely independent of each other or that interact with each other in predictable ways via tightly specified
interfaces.18 Decisions made in one sub-system then do not affect other sub-systems in unanticipated
ways. As a result, no further coordination is necessary and project teams can work in parallel. Such
modularity has been touted to lead, for instance, to faster product innovation.19 The search for good sets
of choices – the equivalent of strategizing in this context – is enhanced by modular organizing.
In light of these potential benefits, a number of U.S. car manufacturers embraced the idea of modular
product design. Cars were decomposed into various sub-systems, and cross-functional teams were
assigned to each module. To achieve this structure, firms such as Chrysler disbanded their functional
organizations in favor of organizing around products and assigning people to temporary project teams.20
It is thus somewhat surprising to see that Toyota’s vehicle-development process – still the most efficient
in the industry – has maintained a functionally based organization, with very limited use of crossfunctional teams. At Toyota, coordination is not achieved (or made less relevant) by a modular design.
Rather, high-level chief engineers provide coordination and integration.21
How can we explain Toyota’s insistence not to organize so that interdependencies are within group
boundaries? To shed light onto this question, we consider a decision problem that is perfectly
decomposable: the interaction structure shown in Panel B of Figure 3. With this interaction pattern, a task
allocation aaaabbbb creates two sub-systems that contain all interactions within the two departments with
no interactions across departments. This structure, thus, would correspond to a modular set-up. In
contrast, Toyota does not perfectly decompose but uses high-level coordination. This would correspond,
for instance, to a task allocation aabbbbaa embedded in a hierarchical structure. In this case, interactions
across the two departments (the two functions) still exist, and each department needs to involve the chief
engineer (or in our model, the “CEO”) before implementing decisions.
The first two columns in Figure 8 show the average performance in period 200 of firms with these
two structures. Surprisingly, even though the decision problem is perfectly decomposable, a task
allocation that completely decomposes the decision problem (column 1) does not produce the highest
performance. The incompletely decomposed task allocation embedded in a hierarchical structure (column
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2) does better. The performance boost requires both the task allocation aabbbbaa and the hierarchical
structure. Adding a chief engineer to the decomposed task allocation aaaabbbb creates no benefit, as a
comparison of the first and third columns in Figure 8 shows: once the decision problem is perfectly
decomposed and no cross-departmental interdependencies remain, coordination is unnecessary and the
extra hierarchical level does nothing (i.e., the first and the third columns show identical performance).
Likewise, as the fourth column in Figure 8 shows, adopting a task allocation with overlap but leaving the
departments decentralized leads to the worst outcome.
< INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE>
Why does an incompletely decomposed task allocation, together with a coordinating level, lead to
higher performance than a completely decomposed task allocation? Even when the task allocation places
all interactions within departments, each department faces rich interactions internally. That is, it faces a
strategizing problem with many local peaks. Each department therefore runs a risk of becoming locked
into a suboptimal solution before it explores the range of possibilities broadly. In the firm with the
completely decomposed task allocation, each department tends to settle prematurely into a mediocre set
of choices. In the firm with incomplete decomposition, interactions across modules create a very different
search dynamic: changes in each department alter conditions in the other, prying departments off of
equilibria and requiring each department to continue its search. If this firm did not have a coordinator,
such conflict between departments could lead to instability and low performance (as seen in the fourth
column of Figure 8). With a coordinator, however, who can veto parochially beneficial proposals that
undermine total firm performance, the extra search engendered by the interactions that are left in place
can lead to superior final results.
It is exactly this dynamic that is portrayed by Sobek, Liker, and Ward in their description of Toyota’s
product development process.22 For instance, in designing a new model of the Celica sports car, the
styling department suggested a design change to the front panel, giving the car a more exciting look. This
change, however, forced manufacturing to re-think its existing tooling. In response, manufacturing made
suggestions, which in turn led to changes in design. The coordination of this exchange was orchestrated at
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the level of the chief engineer and the general manager of manufacturing. From this “conflict” emerged
an innovative and easily manufactured design, one that likely would not have arisen without
interdependencies across these functions.
This situation gives us the second instance of our general pattern: a good choice of organizing
prevents strategizers from locking into sets of choices prematurely, while still allowing the firm to hold
onto good solutions. In this case, the “unnecessary” overlap between the departments dislodges each
department from early solutions and rejuvenates the search process, while the coordinator makes sure that
great sets of choices are not lost. For Section 3’s reintegrators, the early period of decentralization ensured
broad search, while the later period of integration made good choices permanent.
To show that the underlying mechanism in this section and the last section are very similar, we
conduct one last simulation. Rather than using the hierarchical form to create coordination, we construct a
decentralized firm that sequences its task allocation from one with overlap (aabbbbaa) to one that
perfectly decomposes the system (aaaabbbb). As the fifth column in Figure 8 shows, this sequencing also
produces better performance than the perfectly decomposed structure alone can achieve. While the
hierarchical structure with overlap creates a simultaneous balance between search and coordination, the
sequenced decentralized firm creates this balance over time. In either case, firms that manage this tradeoff
well improve performance over a firm that looks, at least at first glance, optimally organized for the
decomposable problem it faces.

5. Low-level exploration that reduces firm-level exploration
When a firm’s environment changes rapidly and radically, top managers often want to encourage the
firm to explore a broad range of new possibilities. A common way to do this involves a shift in
organizing: give low-level managers wider freedom to consider changes in individual departments,
divisions, or regions. This sentiment is expressed most passionately in the popular management literature.
When facing an industry inflexion point, says Intel’s Andy Grove, “let chaos reign” for a while before
“reining in chaos.” Hamel exhorts top managers to find “activists” and “rebels” far down in the
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organization, while Handy urges firms to place low-level managers in a “federal” structure where “power
resides at the lowest possible point.”23 Unleashed, the low-level managers will explore creative new
options and so will the firm.
An implicit assumption in such an organizational shift is that wider exploration at the bottom of a
firm will result in broader exploration for the firm as a whole. Conversely, restricting the exploratory
efforts of low-level managers will narrow overall exploration. But is this assumption always valid? Case
examples cast doubt on it. Consider, for example, an American industrial computing firm that, a few years
ago, increased the latitude of department managers to seek innovations.24 In response, department
managers broadened the array of creative options they considered. Many of the options that department
managers brought forward, however, corporate managers felt they had to quash because the proposals did
not fit with the direction of the corporation; low-level exploration led to little innovation that was useful
to the firm. Subsequently, senior managers forced departments to trim their list of innovative projects by
33%. The rate of new product introductions – a rough proxy for the firm’s exploratory success – then rose
by 150%. In this last turn of events, restrictions on lower-level exploration appeared, paradoxically, to
enhance the exploration of the firm as a whole.
Our simulation sheds light on why lower-level exploration might backfire, narrowing the exploration
of the firm as a whole, and why restrictions on lower-level exploration might broaden firm-level
exploration. Consider a set of hierarchical firms that face a fully interdependent set of choices, as in
Figure 3A. The firms differ from each other in terms of ALT, the number of alternatives to the status quo
that each department manager can consider per period. Capturing the degree of lower-level exploration,
ALT ranges from 1 (i.e., a department manager can weigh only a single option) to 4 (the manager can
explore all four single-decision changes that are possible in the department).
Simulation results, reported in Figure 9, show that average performance declines significantly as
department managers engage in greater exploration. The performance decline derives from differences in
firm-wide exploration: though all firms face the same performance landscapes, firms with higher ALT
explore less of each landscape before locking in on a configuration of choices. For instance, a firm with
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ALT = 1 adopts about twice as many distinct configurations on average during a 200-period simulation
than does a firm with ALT = 4. Likewise, the average number of sticking points – configurations of
choices from which a firm will never change – rises with ALT, as show in Figure 9. These two patterns
suggest that, as department-level exploration increases, the firm as a whole gets frozen at more locations
and explores less of the landscape. Narrow exploration then causes poor performance.25
< INSERT FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE>
But what’s the mechanism by which an increase in departmental exploration narrows exploration for
the firm as a whole? The answer lies in the organizational structure of the firm: the incentives, flow of
information, and decision allocation within it. Because department managers have a charter to evaluate
and sort alternatives before discussing them with the upper-level coordinative body, department managers
are able to screen out proposals they do not like and shield them from the view of senior management.
The more department managers explore, the more thoroughly they can engage in screening. Consider, for
instance, two firms that start with the same configuration of choices: 00001111 (0000 in department A
and 1111 in department B). The firms differ only in terms of ALT: ALT = 4 in one firm, and ALT = 1 in
the other. Suppose that, among department A’s four alternatives, 0001 and 0010 are better than 0000 for
the department, and 0100 and 1000 are worse. Finally, recall that department managers are required to
send the CEO two proposals each period. In a firm where departmental managers can explore all four
alternatives every period (ALT = 4), the manager of department A will always choose 0001 and 0010 as
the two proposals to send. The manager will perpetually screen out 0100 and 1000, even if those options
are better for the firm as a whole. In a firm with ALT = 1, in contrast, the department manager will pick
just one of the four alternatives at random and – required to submit two proposals to the CEO – will send
up that alternative regardless of whether he or she likes it. (The manager’s other proposal will be the
status quo 0000.) In the long run, the department manager can hide nothing from the CEO, and this
promotes wide exploration for the firm as a whole.
This simulation result – that greater exploration at the department level dampens exploration for the
entire firm – proves to be quite robust. In related work, we have found that the result holds up even when
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department managers have the cognitive power to consider more distant alternatives in their domains,
when CEOs can weigh more options per period, when more proposals flow from the departments to the
CEO, and when there is less than full interdependence among the firm’s decisions.26 Only two, extreme
changes to the model eliminate the result. First, if there are no interactions at all across the departments,
then what is best for the each department is best for the firm as a whole, and the screening out of
information does no harm since department managers choose to promote precisely what is in the firm’s
best interests. Second, screening and its harmful effects disappear if department managers are required to
send every alternative they examine to the CEO – an unrealistic situation.
Note that the mechanism at play here is quite similar to the ones in Sections 3 and 4. In each instance,
interactions raise the danger that strategizers will lock-in prematurely and get stuck on low sticking
points. Restrictions on low-level search, a period of decentralization, “unnecessary” overlap across
departments – all of these are approaches to organizing that encourage adequate exploration in the process
of strategizing.
The practical implications of our result become clear through three examples, which illustrate three
critical elements of the model. The model posits, first, that managers in one part of a firm may spot an
opportunity that is good for the firm as a whole but opt not to communicate it because it is not in their
parochial interests. This issue arises often in firms that attempt to cross-sell from one division to another.
Andersen Worldwide, for instance, struggled mightily in the 1980s and 1990s to encourage partners in its
audit practice to refer leads for consulting engagements to its consulting wing.27 Yet the accounting
partners, fearful of damaging their reputations with clients and eager to book consulting revenue within
the audit division, were reluctant to reveal leads, even when doing so would have been profitable for the
firm as a whole. In the words of one industry observer, “most companies have problems cross-selling
across their business units…[since the main challenge is] to get one end of the business to help another.”28
In Andersen’s case, the struggle ended in an acrimonious corporate divorce.
The second critical element of our model is that high-level managers act to rein in low-level proposals
that do not fit corporate objectives. Such high-level discretion is illustrated by events at Whirlpool, the
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world’s largest appliance maker. In 1999, Whirlpool’s Executive Committee sought to encourage
“innovation from everywhere and everyone” in order to escape a “stalemate” in its core appliance
business.29 Regional organizations set up “I-teams” to pursue new opportunities, established “I-boards” to
support the I-teams, set up local seed funds for new ideas, and learned innovation techniques from
consultants. The resulting burst of pilot projects covered a wide spectrum: a line of exercise equipment, a
household maid service, and a modular system of equipment for tailgate parties, for instance. Indeed,
many projects were so far removed from Whirlpool’s core business that, by 2001, the Executive
Committee had to put new mechanisms in place to rein in the innovations and tie them to existing brands.
Finally, our model requires that low-level exploration, information screening, and high-level
oversight combine to produce inertia. As an example, consider Clayton Christensen’s description of harddrive manufacturer Seagate’s failure to respond to the then-new 3.5-inch architecture.30 While top
executives at Seagate received proposals from engineers to support the development of the 3.5-inch
product, Seagate’s marketing organization sent extensive information to the top executives indicating that
the market and the margins for this new product were small. The marketing organization, pursuing its
interests, was more eager to develop high-margin products for existing customers and had little incentive
to push the new product. Given the alternatives made available by the engineering and marketing
departments, top management decided essentially to stick with the technological status quo and to forego
broader technological and market exploration. Eventually, this led to a severe decline in Seagate’s market
position.
These examples suggest four practical responses to the tension we identify, between low-level and
firm-level exploration. All four call on a firm to alter how it organizes in order to affect how it strategizes.
First, department managers might be given incentives to take firm-level interactions into account when
evaluating and proposing alternatives. This mitigates the problem of parochial screening of information,
but it dulls incentives at the department level and creates a costly need to provide department managers
with the expertise and information to take interactions into account. Andersen, for instance, worked to
find incentive-based solutions to its referral problem, but ultimately could not find a system that gave
21

both auditors and consultants appropriate incentives to perform well within their own domains and to
refer clients to the other part of the business.
Second, a firm might avoid parochial screening by requiring department managers to send up a range
of radically different proposals (in our simulation model, more than the two proposals per department),
particularly if prior proposals have been rejected. This ensures that a rich variety of ideas reaches the level
of the organization at which firm-wide implications can be assessed, and this might pry firms off of lowlying sticking points. Such a requirement, however, increases the coordinating and processing burden on
top management. At Whirlpool, for instance, it is hard to imagine getting the desired results from
“innovation from everywhere and everyone” by having all 68,000 employees submit proposals,
unfiltered, to the nine-person Executive Committee.
Third, top management might define arenas within which low-level managers can explore freely. This
makes it less likely that senior managers will subsequently quash departmental initiatives. Whirlpool
eventually took this approach, with the CEO identifying the existing brands as the “sandbox” in which
regional innovators could “play.” The approach puts some limits on exploration, of course, and it
presumes that top managers have the information and insight necessary to spot the promising arenas for
strategizing. Moreover, the approach must be taken delicately, lest it suffocate productive sparks of
creativity at low levels of a firm. At Whirlpool, for instance, the senior managers who were pulling
innovation efforts back into the sandbox had to be very careful to recognize and reward managers who
had explored more broadly before the sandbox was defined. This sent a signal that future innovators,
within the sandbox, would be rewarded for their contributions.
Lastly, one might radically change the approach to organizing by removing the coordinating body,
our CEO. “Decapitation” would eliminate an important source of inertia – the CEO, who retains the status
quo rather than engage in any exploration that degrades performance – and this would lead to broader
search. But like the decentralized firm in Section 3, such an organization would bear a severe risk of poor
coordination between department managers. In sum, we see several practical responses that may mitigate
the tension between low-level exploration and firm-level exploration, but none that costlessly resolves it.
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6. Discussion and conclusion
Decades of research on organizations have produced a rich variety of valuable perspectives on the
role of organizing. Organizational design decisions have been viewed in light of their impact on a firm’s
ability to process information, their effect on the motivation of employees to expend effort, and their
influence on firm incentives to invest in relationship-specific assets, for instance.31 The lens we adopt
highlights the impact of organizing on strategizing. Organizing affects how a management team searches
for a set of intertwined choices that enables a firm to thrive in its environment – that is, how the team
strategizes. In emphasizing the effect of organizing on strategizing and stressing the role of interactions,
we echo classic research on organizations: Alfred Chandler on structures that enable strategies involving
massive coordination of goods; Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch on organizations that integrate
differentiated parts; and James Thompson on organizations that handle pooled, sequential, and reciprocal
interdependence among tasks.32 Our claim is not that organizing matters only because it affects
strategizing. Rather, our view is that one major role of organizing is to set the stage for strategizing. We
feel that recent research has paid too little attention to this role and, in particular, to the way that
interactions affect this role.
Interactions among decisions make strategizing difficult. They raise the specter that incremental
search for a good set of choices will leave a firm prematurely stuck – saddled with poor performance, yet
lacking a clear path for improvement. A role of organizing is to help managers cope with this challenge.
Good organizational structures help a firm achieve two ends that may seem at odds with each other: to
search broadly for a good combination of strategic choices, and to lock in on such a combination once it is
discovered. The seemingly odd features of our main examples – the period of decentralization at Schwab,
the unnecessary overlap across departments at Toyota, and the reining in of low-level managers at the
industrial computing company – all were mechanisms to encourage broad search. Each served to shake
strategizing efforts off low sticking points and guide them toward higher optima. Each prevented a firm
from locking into a sticking point prematurely, before a wide range of options was considered. And each
was coupled with an organizational device to achieve stability in the long run: a period of integration at
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Schwab, and a central coordinator at Toyota and the industrial computing company. In the face of
interactions, a central challenge of organizing efforts is to balance search and stability.
The model that produces this insight has certain limits. Perhaps most strikingly, it focuses exclusively
on formal aspects of organizational design such as the vertical hierarchy and the allocation of tasks to
department managers. It ignores informal aspects of design such as corporate culture and social networks,
which surely play important roles in achieving coordination in real firms. Informal design elements are an
intriguing subject for future research. Even though the model in this paper ignores informal aspects of
design, the model illustrates two general ways in which agent-based simulations of organizational design
are useful. First, the model offers a tool for exploring design choices that are seemingly odd yet
effective. Second, such simulations enable us to drill down to fundamental considerations that drive
design in the face of interactions – for instance, the need to balance search and stability.
The onus for striking this balance falls on senior management. More broadly, senior managers bear
responsibility for dealing with interactions among decisions, particularly interactions that span department
borders. In a sense, it is such interactions that make senior management necessary: without cross-cutting
interactions, department managers could make decisions independently and the firm would be no worse
for it. Our perspective is that effective senior managers usually cope with intricate interactions not by
“figuring it all out” and enacting the perfect strategy up-front, but by crafting an organization that can
search effectively for and stabilize around a great strategy. The shift in mindset from “my job is to design
a great strategy” to “my job is to design an organization that can search well for a great strategy” is
challenging but crucial.
The need to balance search and stability has an intriguing implication. It is widely acknowledged that
firms ossify as they age. In the popular business press, this tendency is bemoaned, and dinosaurs are
urged to dance. Among scholars, the presence of inertia is more willingly accepted. In particular, Michael
Hannan and John Freeman have argued that customers and other constituencies want organizations to be
reliable and accountable, and these traits may require some structural inertia.33 Thus there are reasons
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that, in ecological competition, inert firms may be selected for survival. While this logic identifies some
benefits of inertia once it arrives, it does not explain why the gradual onset of inertia may be beneficial.
Our models and our examples identify, however, a virtue of creeping ossification – gradual
movement from ways of organizing that encourage broad search toward ways of organizing that embrace
stability. In the face of interactions, a firm that is stable from the outset will lock in on a sticking point
quickly, even if the sticking point produces mediocre performance. A firm that never stabilizes will
wander broadly, again achieving mediocre performance on average (despite fleeting moments of
brilliance). A happy medium resides in a firm that shifts over time from broad search toward stability.
Early on, it embraces temporary downward movement on the performance landscape, accepting this as
the cost of broad search. Over time, it becomes less accepting of downward movement until it locks in
permanently on a way of doing business. This process resembles “annealing,” a well-known mathematical
technique for solving tough combinatorial optimization problems.34 In this logic, we see an argument,
albeit a speculative one, that firms may benefit from the gradual onset of inertia, not just the presence of
inertia. The key to successful strategizing may lie in organizing to manage the transition from search to
stability, and back to search should an environmental change require renewed adaptation. Competition
may select for survival those firms that organize well to strategize.
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Figure 1: Performance landscape with no interactions

Figure 2: Performance Landscape with interactions
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Figure 3: Influence matrices
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Figure 4: Different organizational structures
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27

Figure 5: The benefits of reintegration in the presence of interactions
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Figure 6: Reintegration does not yield a benefit in the absence of interactions
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Figure 7: The benefit of reintegration as a function of the degree of environmental change
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Figure 8: The benefits of unnecessary overlap
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Figure 9: The potential pitfall of lower level exploration
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